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I. INTRODUCTION

While every nation in the world proscribes the bribery of
domestic government officials,1 very few of these nations have
extended the prohibition to similarly condemn the bribery of
foreign public officials. 2 In many countries, the practice of
"transnational bribery"3 has become a routine aspect of
conducting business in foreign lands. Whether bribes are given in
response to official demands or in an attempt to derive a
competitive advantage, businesses frequently view the practice as
a prerequisite to securing lucrative contracts in foreign states.
Corruption involving public officials has reached new
proportions in recent years. The end of the Cold War, the spread
of democracy, and growing deregulation and privatization have
fostered a climate conducive to the increasing incidence and
magnitude of corrupt business practices. 4 The transition to

See Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing TransnationalBribery Through the
1.
World Trade Organization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 318-21 (1997) (noting
that corruption is universally proscribed by national laws and is likewise
condemned by each of the major religious and moral schools of thought).
Making bribe payments to foreign officials is legally condoned in every
2.
country, except the United States and Sweden. See id. at 349.
This term will be used throughout this Note to refer to the practice of
3.
bribing foreign officials.
See Robert S. Leiken, An End to Corruption, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 16,
4.
1996, at A15 (stating that "fbiribery and corruption are no longer unmentionables
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market economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
summarily removed all economic restraints, and corruption and
bribery that were previously policed now often go unchecked.5 In
addition, since the economies of countries such as China and

Russia have opened up to international trade and foreign
6
investment, corruption has taken on new dimensions.
As bribery has become increasingly pervasive, the resultant

economic and political costs have risen dramatically, particularly in
7
developing countries undergoing political and economic reform.
Transnational bribery leads to artificially inflated prices and rewards

corruption and inefficiency.

Government procurement decisions

based on the desire for personal enrichment, rather than on
considerations of value and quality, divert scarce resources from
their optimal uses. As trade barriers are eliminated and global
competition becomes increasingly intense, pervasive corruption
threatens the economic growth of developing countries and
discourages desperately needed foreign investment. Developing
countries that have only recently adopted democratic institutions

suffer from political instability, and public perceptions of increased
corruption and declining standards of living may lead to a backlash
against democracy and a return to prior forms of government.8

in international diplomacy); see also Robert S. Leiken, Controlling the Global
CorruptionEpidemic, FOREIGN POL'Y Winter 1996-1997, at 55, 61-65 (stating that
corruption is one of the byproducts of the Cold War); Agnieszka Klich, Bribery in
Economies in Transition: The ForeignCorruptPracticesAct, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 121,
121 (1996) (stating that a negative side-effect of the confusion and dislocation
caused by the move to market-based economies in Eastern and Central Europe is
the rise of corruption in business practices).
5.
See Eastern Europe Launches Purge on Ports Corruption, LLOYD'S LIsT
INT'L, Nov. 6, 1997, at 5, available in 1997 WL 4466561; see also Beverly Earle,
The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 227 (1996), "With the collapse of communism, the great
presence of the state has vanished in the East, leaving every little official who
holds a portion of power tempted to exploit it for his own personal gain.") (quoting
Roberto Lamponi).
6.
See John Mason et al., Goodbye Mr. 10%: John Mason and Guy de
Jonquie'res on the Hurdles Facing Efforts to Eliminate Bribery and Corruption in
InternationalBusiness, FIN. TIMES (London), July 22, 1997, at 15, available in
LEXIS News Library, FINTME File.
7.
See Stephen Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of
InternationalCorrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Is Not the
Answer, 1 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 3, 4 (1995) ("[T]here is no disputing that
today's global business market is riddled with corruption.").
8.
See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Symposium: Law and Ethic in Emerging
Market, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1153, 1154 (1997).
The development prospects of many countries may be seriously
compromised where their schemes for managing the multifarious legal
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As the cost of business bribes becomes increasingly
expensive, the world community has become less willing to accept
bribery as an inherent element of "business as usual."
International organizations, such as the World Trade
Organization, the United Nations, and the OECD, have begun to
institute reforms aimed at curbing the practice of transnational
bribery. Regional organizations and multilateral lenders have also
begun to address the problem. However, recent initiatives against
transnational corruption have two common weaknesses-they
lack enforceability and they do not address corruption on a global
9
scale.
Anti-corruption movements around the world have set the
stage for a comprehensive attack on transnational bribery. The
Organization of American States adopted the first convention to
criminalize transnational bribery in 1996, and efforts by the
OECD to address the issue culminated in the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, which was signed by the representative
Ministers in November 1997, and is expected to enter into force
by 1999. While these developments are promising, they offer only
a partial solution to a complex problem. Transnational bribery will
persist until a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, based on
an understanding of the underlying causes of corruption, is
implemented.
Part II of this Note will examine the prevalence of transnational
bribery in the context of international trade. It then will discuss the
negative impact of transnational bribery on national economies,
political structures, and international trade. Part III will examine the
debilitating impact of transnational bribery on developing countries.

The threat to future economic growth, and the potential to create a
backlash against democracy are highlighted. Part IV will provide an
overview of recent efforts to control and proscribe transnational

dimensions of difficult transitions prove deficient. They face urgent needs
to accomplish difficult tasks, including the following: revising laws to fit
rules of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), devising suitable corporate laws, dealing with the delicate
problems of moving from state ownership to a regime of private ownership,

establishing capital markets and a regime of protection for intellectual
property, readjusting subsidies and social welfare policies, and also
finding mechanisms to curb criminality and exploitative practices. As
yawning gaps widen between the haves and the have-nots, strains on the
social fabric may lead to destabilizing crises. Realistically, capital
importing countries cannot expect to erect perfect frameworks overnight
for comprehensive regulation of all aspects of their economies, but they
should have ways to assign priorities and avoid dangerous pitfalls.
Id.
9.

See infra section IV.

1998]

TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY OFFOREIGN OFFICIALS

1277

bribery. Specifically, the approaches of international organizations,
multilateral development banks, and regional organizations are

described and evaluated. In Part V, the causes endemic to corruption
are reviewed, and effective approaches to controlling transnational
bribery are proposed.

II. THE GROWING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY
A. The Incidence and Magnitudeof Transnational
Bribery are on the Rise
In a recent survey of businesspersons who frequently
conduct business dealings in numerous countries, the results
indicated that in twenty-six of the world's fifty-four largest trading
countries, these people feel that they are more likely to encounter
a corrupt transaction than an honest one. 10 Former U.S.
Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor found that the use of illicit
payments by foreign companies to win business is the preeminent
complaint of U.S. business executives conducting business
overseas. 1 A survey conducted by the World Bank, which
included 3600 fir-ms in sixty-nine countries, indicated that forty
percent of businesses pay bribes. 12
Although
international
business
executives
perceive
corruption and bribery to be most troublesome in developing

countries such as Nigeria,

China, Bangladesh, Kenya, and

Pakistan, much of the problem can be attributed to corrupt
multinational corporations and lax laws in newly industrialized
countries. 13 For example, Fritz Heimann, General Electric's

10.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 331.
11.
See Paul Blustein, U.S. Roils Murky Waters of International Corruption,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), July 21, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 7950663. Former
Commerce Secretary Kantor estimates that bribery and corruption cost U.S. firms
$64 billion in lost business during the 1996 calendar year. Patricia Digh, Shades
of Gray in the Global Marketplace,42 H.R. MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 1997, at 91, 93.
12.
While firms paying bribes in industrial countries represented about
fifteen percent, the figure climbed to sixty percent in the former Soviet Union. See
Thomas Omestad et al., Bye-bye to Bribes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22,

1997, at 39, 42. In Germany it is estimated that more than $5 billion is spent on
foreign bribes every year. Id. at 43. In Venezuela the cost of corruption has been
at least $100 billion over the last two decades. Id. at 44.
13.
Transparency International, a nongovernmental organization based in
Berlin, publishes an annual Corruption Index. See Stephen Handelman,
CorruptionInc.: Powerful Officials around the World Are Milking the Multinationals
for Every Cent They Can Get THE TORONTO STAR, July 13, 1996, at C1. The index
is based on surveys of international business executives. See id. The 1996 survey
found the worst offenders to be Nigeria, China, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Pakistan.
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general counsel, estimates that several billion dollars are lost by
General Electric each year due to bribery demands all over the
world. 14 Peter Eigen, chairman of Transparency International,1 5
asserts that an entrenched system of massive bribery and
kickbacks, distributed by multinational corporations based in the
West and competing for lucrative contracts in transitional
economies, is the source of much corruption in the developing
world. 16

Bribery by transnational corporations has not only become
more widespread in recent years, the going rates have also
increased. Michael Wiehen of Transparency International explains
the phenomenon of inflated bribery and kickback demands: "Mr.
17
10% has ballooned into Mr. 30% in many countries."
Commentators generally agree that bribery demands are
increasing, and the occurrence of corruption on a grand scale has
become the rule, rather than the exception. 1 8 In the last three
years, the U.S. Commerce Department has learned of allegations

Id. New Zealand was judged to be the most corruption free country out of the 54
countries examined. Id. Canada was judged to be the fifth "cleanest country," and
the U.S. was ranked fifteenth. Id.
14.
See Neil King Jr., Coming Clean: EU Firms Await Pact on Banning
Bribery with Mixed Feelings, WALL ST J. EUR., Sept. 23, 1997, at 1 (stating that
General Electric has aggressively sought to have anti-corruption laws extended to
other countries, claiming that its subsidiaries run into dirty practices all over the
world).
15.
Transparency International is an organization dedicated to eliminating
corrupt practices in transnational business. See Handelman, supra note 13, at
Cl. See generallyTRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: THE TI
SOURCE BOOK <http://www.transparecy.de> [hereinafter TI SOURCE BOOK].
16.
See EasternEurope Launches Purge on Ports Corruption, supra note 5.
(warning that large amounts of money generated by drug trafficking and other
illicit activities have enabled organized crime to subvert governmental and
policing bodies by bribing customs, police, and judicial officers, as well as
politicians, tax authorities, and other public servants); see also Two to Tango:
Corruption Plays Bigger Role in Business Than Most of Us Would Like to Think,
INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, PA), Aug. 27, 1997, at A8, available in 1997 WL
4310690 ("I urge the public to recognize that a large share of the corruption is the
explicit product of multinational corporations, headquartered in leading
industrialized countries, using massive bribery and kickbacks to buy contracts in
the developing world and the countries in transition.") (quoting Peter Eigen)
[hereinafter Two to Tango].
17.
Mason, et al., supranote 6, at 15.
18.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 331-32. ("[By 'general consensus, there
has been a tremendous deterioration in the last ten years, with grand corruption
becoming the general rule, rather than the exception in major governmentinfluenced contracts . . . ' "); see also Handelman, supra note 13, at C1
("Corruption is rapidly taking on crisis proportions in the global economy.").
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of bribery by foreign companies in approximately 180 commercial
contracts valued at almost $80 billion.19
B. TransnationalBribery CreatesAllocative Inefficiencies that
Result in Less ProductiveNationalEconomies
Although many countries view bribery as a necessary
measure to ensure that domestic companies are competitive
contenders for foreign contracts, the practice of using such illicit
20
payments raises prices and rewards corruption and inefficiency.

While transnational bribery is undoubtedly most detrimental to
the economies of developing and transitional nations,
businesspersons in Europe and the United States consider
demands for bribes made by foreign public officials to be one of
the greatest problems afflicting international trade. 2 1 Corruption

and transnational bribery pose a tremendous threat to the global
economy by distorting economic markets and corroding the social
structure of societies. 22
First, bribe requirements act as a non-tariff surcharge on
goods and services. The payment of bribes is an additional cost to
the multinational company imposed by the foreign official
demanding the bribe. 23 When a company is required to pay a
percentage of its expected profits to a government official, this
illicit inducement acts like a tax on an investment or
transaction. 24 Companies that pay the bribe will often pass the

See William Daley, Comment & Analysis: Clamping Down on Commercial
19.
Bribery, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 1997, at 22.
See Threat to U.S. Trade and Finance from Drug Trafficking and
20.
International Organized Crime: Hearing before the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control & the Senate Subcomm. on InternationalTrade of the Comm. On
Finance, 104th Cong. 45-46 (1996) (testimony of Robert S. Leiken) [hereinafter
Drug Trafficking Hearing]; see generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Fourteenth
InternationalSymposium on Economic Crime: Corruption-A GeneralReview With an
Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 460-61 (1997)
(noting that corruption can endanger the use of economic choices, increase the
costs of transactions, reduce state revenue, increase public expenditures,
penalize law abiders, and produce adverse distributional effect).
21.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 306.
22.
See id. at 332 ([O]ny the most narrow-minded of persons would not
admit that bribery has become a pan-global phenomenon of enormous
proportion.").
See id. at 333-34.
23.
See Omestad et al., supra note 12, at 42. A study conducted by
24.
Harvard's Shang-Jin Wei concluded that worsening a government's corruption
level from that of Singapore (which is relatively low) to that of Mexico (which is
significantly higher) produces the same financial effect as a twenty-one percent
tax hike on foreign investors. See id.
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cost on to consumers in the form of increased prices.2 5 The
inevitable result of increased prices will be reduced sales levels of
the product for which the bribe was demanded. 2 6 Ultimately, the
bribe requirement reduces the foreign company's ability to market
its products in a country.
The situation becomes increasingly problematic as the bribe
demand rises in relation to the expected earnings of the goods or
services to be produced. While a company may be able to absorb
the cost of a ten percent commission paid to a foreign official, by
raising the product's price and trimming its gross profit margin,
the company must become more creative when a twenty percent
commission is demanded. 2 7 To avoid losing the valuable foreign
contract, the supplier may have to increase the product's price,
accept a lower gross profit margin,
and reduce the quality of his
28
product to achieve cost savings.
29
Second, bribery enables the creation of defacto monopolies.
Often, a domestic company will make a bribe payment to secure a
business opportunity and will then make an additional bribe
payment to exclude foreign rivals from the market.3 0 This practice
discourages foreign suppliers from entering international
markets. Furthermore, the existence of monopolistic product
markets leads to inefficiency and artificially inflated prices.
Third, the payment of bribes causes economic waste and
inefficiency.3 1 The payment of bribes distorts the fundamental
underpinnings of a free market economy.3 2 In a free marketplace,
buyers and sellers compete for business on the basis of value

25.
A bribe requirement may be insurmountable in two instances: (1) the
company does not know how to make bribes, or (2) the company is legally
prohibited from making bribe payments. Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
17 I.L.M. 214 (1978), United States companies may be prosecuted criminally for
bribe payments to foreign officials. In addition, several foreign companies have
policies against making illicit payments to foreign officials.
26.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 334.
27.
A twenty percent commission is not an unusual demand in the current
global business climate. See id. at 335.
28.
See id. For example, if a twenty percent commission on the original

price is demanded, the supplier who is unwilling to walk away from the contract
may be forced to increase his price by ten percent, reduce his gross margin by five
percent and reduce the ,quality of his goods or services in such a way that he
saves five percent. See id29.
See id.
30.
See id. at 336 (noting that examples of such practices abound).
31.
See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A CriticalAnalysis of
the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 249 (1997); See also
Nichols, supranote 1, at 339.
32.
In addition, the payment of bribes has been linked with low economic
growth, as measure by gross domestic product. See Salbu, supranote 31, at 249.
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optimization. 3 3 Ideally, buyers will place a greater value on
products with superior quality and competitive prices. The
payment of bribes causes buyers to instead consider extraneous
factors, such as the amount of side payments and the discrete
nature of the seller.3 4 When bribe payments are demanded by
public officials, suppliers who might have won a contract based
on value optimization are often rejected in favor of the corrupt
official's opportunity for personal enrichment. 35
A system that condones the practice of bribery is
consequently a system of inferior quality purchasing decisions
36
resulting in the misallocation of scarce government resources.
In addition, corrupt officials frequently allow companies to
underreport their taxes in exchange for illicit payments.3 7 This
practice is harmful to national economies in two respects. First,
the unjust tax leniency depletes the treasuries funding the
provision of public services.3 8 Second, the relative tax burdens to
individual citizens are not fairly allocated, and individual
taxpayers may perceive that they are paying more than their fair
share.3 9 This undermines the legitimacy of the country's system
of taxation.
Corrupt payments to foreign officials divert resources from
their most efficient uses in several other ways. Resources are
consumed in the effort to hide dishonest transactions and to
maintain an atmosphere of secrecy. 4 ° Also, officials who refuse to
allocate resources to their most efficient uses may themselves
plunder such resources. 41 Finally, corrupt officials often retain

33.

See id. (stating that bribery "pollutes the purity of transactions in a

free marketplace").
34.
See id
35.
See id. at 250. The costs connected with bribery include a distortion of
how officials decide to allocate the resources or public goods that they are
charged with distributing.
36.
See generally Jay M. Vogelson, Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of
InternationalBusiness,American Bar Association Section of International Law and
Practice Reports to the House of Delegates (Spring, 1996), reprinted in 30 INT'L
LAW 193, 198 (1996) (stating that corrupt practices in connection with
international business create inefficiencies by distorting the allocation of
resources).

37.
See Salbu, supra note 31, at 251.
38.
See id.
39.
See id.
40.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 338; see also Earle, supra note 5, at 222
(stating that "there are distortions entailed by the necessary secrecy of

corruption").
41.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 338.
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large amounts of valuable resources in an attempt to increase the
42
premium that bribe givers will be willing to pay.
C. TransnationalBribery Leads to PoliticalInstabilityand the
Disruptionof InternationalTrade
While threatening the economic health of countries,
transnational bribery also leads to social corrosion and political
43 When the occurrence of corruption
instability.A
is widespread, it
decreases the credibility and the viability of a government. 44
Public officials may be perceived as self-interested and
hypocritical when they engage in wrongful acts, yet demand legal
obedience from private citizens. 45 Such a visible double standard
may eventually lead to lawlessness by blurring the distinction
between legal and illegal behavior. 46 Furthermore, when
corruption within the government is pervasive, "moral" persons
are less likely to pursue careers as public officials, and
individuals more inclined to behave dishonestly become
increasingly attracted to government employment. 4 7 This
phenomenon plays a role in shaping the culture of the
bureaucracy.
Ultimately, pervasive corruption within a government may so
disgust the public that the government is ousted. 48 In countries
such as France, India, Italy, Japan, and Venezuela political
parties have been voted out at least partially due to popular
contempt with corrupt practices. 49 In less severe cases,
governments publicly perceived as corrupt have been
substantially weakened or forced to resign.,5 0 Often when the

42.

See id

43.
See Muffler, supra note 7, at 16-17; see also Nichols, supra note 1, at
342.
44.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 342.
45.
See id. See also Drug Trafficking Hearing, supra note 20, at 46
(corruption "destroys the people's trust in their government, breeds mutual
distrust among citizens, subverts the rule of law and undermines the worth [sic]
ethic").
46.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 343. ("When the government tolerates
and even engages in certain types of illegal behavior, it becomes difficult to
determine what behavior is and is not acceptable.").
47.
See id. See also Drug Trafficking Hearing,supra note 20, at 46. (noting
that corruption perverts incentives: public office is seen as the road to riches,
productive enterprise and hard work as risky).
48.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 343-44.
49.
See id at 344; see also Muffler, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that bribery
by foreign businesses has also contributed to the fall of governments in Bolivia,
Honduras, the Cook Islands, and the Netherlands).
50.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 344. The governments of Korea and
Mexico have been weakened by widespread disgust with governmental corruption.
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public reaction does not result in the demise of a government, it
will instead lead to a process of public disengagement from the
government.5 1 Citizens may turn to "mob justice" or refuse to
52
comply with state laws.
In addition to destabilizing the political structure of a nation,
corrupt business transactions weaken the global trading system and
disrupt international trade relations.5 3 National governments are
increasingly less willing to condone attempts by foreign corporations
to bribe their public officials. Malaysia recently banned the award of
future government contracts to any British companies after
discovering that a British firm 5 4 had paid a $50,000 bribe to secure a
contract.,5 This relatively small bribe resulted in the disruption of
trade between the two former trading partners. When a bribery
S6
scandal was exposed in Singapore, five multinational corporations
57
were banned from bidding for future local power contracts. Indeed,
illicit payments by foreign business entities may create a "backlash"
against the country of origin and international business generally. 5 8

III. THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY ON DEVELOPING NATIONS
The harmful effects caused by the practice of transnational
bribery are particularly acute in developing countries.5 9 The term

See id. In Ecuador, the vice president was forced to resign, and the presidents of

Brazil and Venezuela were also forced to resign. See id.
51.
See id.
52.
See id. For example, Russian peasants reacted to corruption within the
Tsarist and Bolshevik regimes by avoiding the official court system and instead
seeking justice in their own samosud. See id. Similarly, Kenyans wary of
corruption within their judicial system turned to mob justice, whereby private
citizens empowered themselves to attack and kill suspected criminals. See id.
53.
See Michael Kantor, NationalExport Strategy, Toward the Next American
Century: A U.S. Strategic Response to Foreign Competitive Practices, BUSINESs
AMERICA, Sept. 1996, at 112, 113.
54.
George Wimpey International.
55.
See Muffler, supra note 7, at 17; Michael Almond & Scott Syfert,
Beyond Compliance: Corruption, CorporateResponsibility and Ethical Standards in
the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INTL LAW & COM. REG. 389, 435 (1997).
56.
See Almond & Syfert, supra note 55, at 435. These corporations
included BICC of Britain, Siemens of Germany, Pirelli of Italy, and Tomen and
Marubeni, both of Japan. See id.
57.
See id.
58.
Muffler, supranote 7, at 18.
59.
See Leiken, Controllingthe Global Corruption Epidemic, supra note 4, at
70.
Public opinion surveys published in 1995 by the U.S. Information Agency
disclosed that majorities in Central and Eastern Europe believe that
corruption has increased since the collapse of communism. In China,
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"developing countries" will be used to refer to countries undergoing
economic, political, or social transitions to facilitate increased
interaction with the global marketplace. 60 Examples of "developing
countries" include former socialist countries currently engaged in
privatization, such as Russia and the Eastern European nations, as
well as the formerly isolated economies of Southeast Asia and Africa.
Also included in the category of "developing countries" are Latin
American countries emerging from military dictatorships
61
adopting democratic governance.

and

A. Developing Countriesare More Vulnerable to the Threat of
TransnationalCorruption

During times of transition, new opportunities for corrupt
practices and rent-seeking arise. 62 The process of reform typically
involves the privatization of state enterprises, deregulation, and

the expansion of trade and financial markets. In many countries,
the transition has been accompanied by a "shift of economic
63
Without
policy from central planning to free marketeering."
strong political institutions and governmental oversight, the
political system becomes particularly susceptible to manipulation

corruption arrests have risen sharply, and the scale of covert transactions
has grown markedly .... In April 1996, China announced that it would
prosecute 18 former government officials for allegedly embezzling... $2.2
billion.
Id. at 61. See generally Nichols, supra note 1, at 345; Christopher F. Dugan &
Vladimir Lechtman, Current Development: The FCPA in Russia and Other Former
Communist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378 (1997); Kantor, supra note 53;
Nadeem Ul Haque & Ratna Sahay, Do Government Wage Cuts Close Budget
Deficits? Costs of Corruption, 43 INTL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS, No. 4, 754,
760 (Dec. 1, 1996) ("The limited recorded evidence suggests that corruption is
quite pervasive in developing countries and transition economies, and that it
imposes significant economic costs.").
60.
For the sake of consistency, the author uses the term "developing
countries" throughout this Note. Other authors have used the terms "emerging
countries" and "transitional nations" to refer to the same concept.
61.
Every country in Latin America now practices some form of democracy,
except Cuba. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combating Corruption: Focus on Latin
America, 3 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 179, 181 (1996).
62.
See Karen Permar et al., The Destructive Costs of GreasingPalms, Bus.
W., Dec. 6, 1993, at 133, 138 (noting that countries in transition experience
chaotic conditions, and weakened governments have permitted new corruption
opportunities to arise in Russia and Eastern Europe).
63.
Karl M. Meessen, Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) (noting that while Third World nations and Eastern
Europe are examples of countries in transition, the industrialized world has also
"entered a new phase of deregulation and privatization").
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Many politicians have taken advantage of the

temporary political instability present during the transitional

period to promote their own self-enrichment. 65
The prevalence of corruption and transnational bribery in
developing countries is due, in part, to factors peculiar to
transitional economies. First, bribery is less expensive in
developing countries than in the First World. 6 6 Because of
deflated currencies and lower standards of living, favors can be
purchased in developing countries for prices that 6 7seem
comparatively low to executives from industrialized nations.
Second, bureaucracies in developing nations are often only
one evolutionary step removed from regimes in which corruption
was thoroughly embedded in governmental institutions and
traditional attitudes. 6 8 In many cases, the use of bribes
throughout the hierarchy of government officials was previously
an accepted practice, and therefore underpaid officials deem
69
themselves entitled to such additional payments.
Third, because the standard of living often initially declines in
a transitional economy, bureaucrats become increasingly aware
that their position of authority provides them with substantial
70
opportunities to make money in the new commercial world.
Often, government officials in developing countries possess
unbridled discretion to decide the fate of lucrative deals and to

determine whether to perform "rubber-stamping" activities. 7 1 The

See Boswell, supranote 61, at 183. The very fact that these countries
64.
are undergoing such radical transitions magnifies the effects of corruption; as de
Tocqueville noted, "a society is most vulnerable when it is undergoing change."
Nichols, supranote 1, at 345.
65.
See Boswell, supra note 61, at 182. The transitional period in Latin
America, in which military dictatorships are being replaced by democratic
governments, has been imbued with scandals and corruption. See id. at 181-83.
Scandals have recently come to light involving the former heads of state in the
Dominican Republic, Peru, Bolivia, and Panama. See id. at 182. Former Brazilian
President Collor implemented his "Plano Collor" to reduce the inflation associated
with a transitional economy. See iU. at 181. During the process of its
implementation, millions of dollars were siphoned from public coffers, and
investigative efforts by the federal police and the judiciary were repeatedly
obstructed. See id. at 181-82.
66.
See Klich, supra note 4, at 132 ("[Blribery and extortion are rampant
because their price is still extraordinarily low. With runaway inflation, Russian
bureaucrats have watched their standard of living decline. Russian bureaucrats

are cheaper to buy' than bureaucrats in most other countries.").
67.
68.
63-65.
69.
70.
71.

See Dugan & Lechtman, supra note 59, at 378.
See Leiken, Controlling the Global CorruptionEpidemic, supra note 4, at
See id. at 70-73.
See Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 59, at 378.
See id. This is especially true in Russia and Eastern Europe. See id.
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disproportionately high value of hard currencies is an added
incentive for officials to squeeze money out of foreign companies
when the opportunity presents itself.72
Fourth, the legal and political confusion inherent in periods
of transition and overhaul results in a reduced level of
enforcement activities. 73 Even when anti-corruption measures are
enacted, because high-ranking officials are legally immune from
such legislation in many developing countries, their behavior
remains unaffected. 7 4 The conduct of foreign business executives
exacerbates the problem. Businessmen from every industrialized
nation, except the United States and Sweden, freely engage in the
practice of bribing foreign officials in return for favorable
treatment without fearing legal consequences. 75 The governments
of many European nations actively encourage the payment of
bribes to promote business transactions in foreign lands by
76
allowing tax deductions for such illicit payments.
B. The DestabilizingEffect of TransnationalCorruptionis
ParticularlyDebilitatingto Developing Countries
In developing countries, "corruption threatens to swallow
whole nations, destroying all faith in democracy and making saps
of anyone who behaves honestly." 77 Bribery and corruption
discourage investment in developing countries and increase the
78
gap between the wealthy elite and the impoverished masses.
Allocative inefficiencies caused by transnational bribery divert
precious resources that could instead be used to promote

72.
73.
74.

See id.
See id.
For example, civil servants in Russia are forbidden from exploiting

their authority to engage in entrepreneurial activities, but many high-ranldng
officials are legally immune from the law's mandates by virtue of their status as
deputies of legislative bodies, employees of the state prosecution service, or
judges. See Corruption is Rife in Russia, Police Chiefs Say, UPI, June 9, 1992,

availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, UPI File.
75.
See Dugan & Lechtman, supranote 59, at 379; Nichols, supranote 1,
at 349.
76.

See generally Rosie Waterhouse, The Sleazy State: Britain 'Resisting

Moves to Halt Bribes to Officials,' INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 16, 1994, at 3
(mentioning several nations that want to continue tax deductibility for bribes);
Pascal Krop, L'Argent Noir de la France,L'EVENEMENT, Sept. 29, 1988, at 50 cited

in John E. Impert, A Programfor Compliance with the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct
and ForeignLaw Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agenis, 24 INT'L LAW. 1009, 1010
n.8 (Winter 1990) (discussing the reputed official French system of bribery in less-

developed countries).
77.
The GreasedPalm Issue, WASH. POST, June 1, 1996, at A14.
78.

See Drug Trafficking Hearing,supranote 20, at 45-46.
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economic growth.79 In addition, corruption creates mutual
distrust among citizens and the government while skewing public
policy and undermining the work ethic. 8 0
1.
Transnational
Growth

Bribery Acts as an Obstacle to Economic

The future of developing countries depends

on economic

growth. Yet, corruption has considerable adverse effects on
economic performance. 8 1 When bribe payments are required, the
cost of goods is artificially increased. Operating costs to the

supplier are higher as well, making the contract less attractive to
foreign investors. For example, Hong Kong's Independent
Commission Against Corruption found that bribes and "grease

payments" average three to five percent of operating costs, or
three to five billion dollars a year.8 2 A Russian study
demonstrated that when food vendors were protected from
demands for bribes and kickbacks, sales prices were reduced by
fifteen to twenty percent.8 3 Such increases in the cost of
84
consumer goods contribute to higher overall rates of inflation.
In addition, the practice of transnational bribery tends to
reduce national revenue and has been tied to a low gross national
product,
stunting the progress
of developing
countries'
economies. 85 A study conducted by the International Monetary

79.
See Pennar et al., supra note 62, at 133 (giving the example of
government officials who buy expensive, unnecessary equipment and receive a
kickback from the seller, thereby taking away resources that could be more
usefully spent).
80.
See Leiken, Controllingthe Global CorruptionEpidemic, supra note 4, at
70.
81.
This is corroborated by a study conducted by Paolo Mauro of the
International Monetary Fund. See Blustein, supranote 11.
82.
Almond & Syfert, supranote 55, at 434.
83.
See id.
84.
See Mark J. Murphy, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair
Trade Practice?,21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 391 (1995); see also Salbu, supra note

31, at 252 (stating that the proliferation of bribery in poor countries has resulted
in inflated contract prices and the discouragement of foreign investment);
Handelman, supra note 13, at C1 (noting that corruption raises the cost of living.
For example, in Vietnam, widespread graft has increased the cost of goods to
consumers by an estimated ten to twenty percent).
85.
See Shihata, supra note 20, at 458-61 (noting that while corruption
may increase the wealth of those practicing it, it reduces the revenue of the state
and the welfare of society as a whole); Nichols, supranote 1, at 347 (noting that
there is a negative correlation between perceived levels of corruption and gross
national product and stating that "corruption does not seem to be a means of
attaining high gross national product."); see also Robert H. Sutton, Controlling
Corruption through Collective Means: Advocating the Inter-American Convention
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Fund revealed that in countries most troubled by corruption and
bribery, the proportion of the economy devoted to business
spending on plant and equipment tends to be significantly lower
than in "cleaner" countries. 86 This ultimately slows economic
growth in "corrupt" countries relative to the rest of the world.
The pervasive presence of transnational bribery in developing
countries deters foreign investment by increasing the costs of
transactions and threatening the reputations of investing
companies. 8 7 Transaction costs are increased by an amount
exceeding that of the bribe itself. The time and expense required

to negotiafe the actual amount of the inducement payment with
corrupt officials is an added cost realized by the investing
company. 8 8 In addition, the uncertainty inherent in the corrupt
transaction and the potential effect of the corrupt payment on a
given transaction act as additional barriers to investment in a
developing country. 8 9
The loss of trade and investment opportunities caused by the
practice of demanding bribes from foreign businesses threatens the
sustained growth of developing countries. 90 A study conducted by the
Harvard University School of Government found that "the difference
in corruption levels from that of Singapore to that of Mexico is
equivalent to raising the marginal tax rate by more than twenty
percent."91 A one percentage point increase in the tax rate typically
92
reduces foreign investment by approximately five percent.
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that as corruption
becomes increasingly widespread within a country, investments
from outside sources decrease both in frequency and in
amount. 93 Statistical evidence confirms the tie between

against Corruption,20 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1427,1430-31 (1997); Salbu, supranote
31, at 249 (stating that the payment of bribes has also been linked to low
economic growth, as measured by gross domestic product). Bribery tends to

decrease tax revenue collection since corrupt officials condone the underreporting
of taxes in return for illicit payments. Salbu, supranote 31, at 251.
86.
See id. See Nichols, supranote 1, at 347-48.
87.
See Shihata, supranote 20, at 460-62. See also Leiken, Controlling the
Global Corruption Epidemic, supra note 4, at 75 ("Studies show that corrupt
procurement practices can not only double the price developing countries pay for

goods and services but can also scare off foreign investors.").
88.
89.
90.

See Sutton, supranote 85, at 1439.
See id.
See Yojana Sharma, Development: World Bank Talks

Tough on

Corruption,Inter-Press Service (Hong Kong), Sept. 22, 1997 ("The biggest inhibitor
to economic development and to the inflow of funds or domestic investment of
funds is corruption.") (quoting World Bank President, James Wolfensohn).

91.

Two to Tango, supranote 16, at A8.
92.
See id.
93.
See Sutton, supranote 85, at 1437. In addition, while the prevalence of
corruption and bribery within a government tends to decline as the country
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corruption and low investment rates. 9 4 Fundamental principles of

economics suggest that reduced rates of private investment
should correlate with declining rates of economic growth. 9 5 In
addition, because of the growing social stigma associated with
bribery, many businesses prefer investing in countries where the
hassles of corruption are less likely to be present, and clean
company reputations are more likely to survive intact. 9 6 A recent
survey commissioned by the World Bank indicated that
international businessmen view corruption as the primary
obstacle to conducting business in Latin America, the Caribbean,
and sub-Saharan Africa. 9 7 The perception of corruption has
dampened public support for development assistance and has
prompted private investors and lenders to redirect funds away
from needy countries. 9 8 By misdirecting and discouraging
investment, corruption acts as a barrier to national
development. 9 9
Governments in developing countries plagued by wide-scale
corruption spend a comparatively small proportion of their
national budgets on education, an expense that is directly related
to sustaining long-term economic growth.1 0 0 This is because
corrupt public officials prefer to channel taxpayer money into
areas more amenable to extracting bribe payments, such as

experiences socioeconomic development, corruption does not necessarily cease to
exist at any given level of development. See id- See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, A
Corrupt Tide in Russiafrom State-Business Ties: Problem Called Biggest Threat to
the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1995, at 1 ("Russia is now a state so webbed by
official corruption that foreign businessmen, economists and Russian analysts

regard it as the largest impediment to the growth of investment and the market
economy-worse than the criminal mafias' that get most of the attention.").
94.
See Erlanger, supra note 93, at 1; see also Boswell, supra note 61, at
184 ("At a time when many countries in the region are desperately seeking foreign
investment, it is important to recognize that high levels of corruption are
associated with lower levels of investment.").
95.
See Nichols, supranote 1, at 348.
96.
For example, several American companies have backed out of
potentially profitable contracts in Russia due to fear of widespread corruption.
See Klich, supra note 4, at 132. One of the indirect costs associated with
widespread bribery is reduced investor confidence in the "corrupt' country. See
John Hogarth, Bribery of Officials in Pursuit of CorporateAims, 6 CRIM. L.F. 557,
559 (1995).
97.
See Mason et al., supranote 6, at 15.
98.
See Sharma, supra note 90. The abuse of official authority for private
gain retards "development and economic growth, hurts the poor the most and
compromises the effectiveness of aid programs." Id.
99.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 348-49. See generally, Pennar et al.,
supra note 62, at 133 ("The real cost of corruption lies in the demoralization,
cynicism, and enervation of entrepreneurial activity throughout the Third
World.") (quoting Robert Klitgard, a University of Natal economist).
100. See Bribonomics,The Economist, Mar. 19, 1999, at 86.
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public works contracts. 10 1 In contrast, collecting bribe payments
in connection with education expenses and teachers' salaries has
proven to be more cumbersome and less profitable. Analogously,
investments in human and physical capital, critical prerequisites
low in
to sustained economic growth, tend to be comparatively
10 2
pernicious.
are
corruption
and
bribery
where
countries
The misallocation of resources that results from an economy
driven by transnational bribery has the greatest impact on the
countries least able to afford it.' 0 3 Corrupt payments that induce

government officials to invest in projects that are unnecessary, or
that convince officials to award contracts based on factors other
than the overall quality of a bid's value, "waste assets in
developing countries that can ill afford to have them
squandered."' 0 4 The scarcity of national resources in developing
countries magnifies the harm caused by wasting or misdirecting
funds.' 0 s Misallocated funds originally intended for schools,
hospitals, and institutions assisting the underprivileged are often
diverted by corrupt officials into projects that provide neither
social nor economic benefits.10 6 For example, in Shenzhen and
Zhuhai, China, funds earmarked for infrastructure and other
beneficial projects were instead invested into speculative real
estate deals that were favored by officials who anticipated deriving
bribes and facilitating payments in connection with the
07
transaction.'

Allocative inefficiencies in developing countries reduce
national income and lead to the accumulation of unnecessary
long-term debt.10 8 When a country's debt is increased, its future

101. See id. (noting that it is easier to collect bribes on some expenditure
items than on others).
102. See Drug Trafficking Hearing,supranote 20, at 96.
103. See Kantor, supranote 53, at 112.
104. Salbu, supranote 3 1, at 252.
105. See id. at 251-52.
106. See Skip Kaltenheuser, Corruption's Heavy Price, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL-WSJA 11015534. In addition, coerced
transactions eventually lead to "reduced productivity and living standards for all."
Murray N. Rothbard, Free Market, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
636, 638 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).
107. See Permar et al., supra note 62, at 136. Corrupt public officials in
rural China have similarly re-channeled state funds intended for grain payments
into speculative ventures. See id.
108. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 347 (noting that allocative inefficiencies
vill reduce current output, which will in turn reduce national income); Boswell,
supra note 61, at 184 (stating that developmental decisions not subject to
oversight leads to the misallocation of resources and the accumulation of
excessive long-term debt); see also Salbu, supra note 31, at 252 (noting that
pervasive bribery leads to a substantial escalation of the debt of developing
countries).
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economic growth is compromised since the country will be

burdened by recurring debt-servicing costs in the future.' 0 9
Funds that could be used to improve living conditions and public
welfare are instead committed to paying off high levels of debt.'n °
A study by the Luigi Einaudi Research Center found that the
Italian government's debt was inflated by an estimated fifteen
percent, or about $200 million, due to corruption and systematic
bribery."' In developing countries with less stable economies,
such bribery may undermine any attempt to build an economic
system capable of competing in the international community. "12
In addition, government decision-making based on inducement
payments rather than value optimization often results in inferior
quality goods and unsafe or unnecessary infrastructure. 1 3 Half-built
schools and roads strewn throughout the developing world illustrate
the costs that result from awarding infrastructure projects to
contractors based solely on their willingness to make bribe payments,
rather than on their competence and efficiency. 114 Often, greedy
public officials motivated by the potential for bribe payments use
government funds to purchase goods that are simply not needed."'
For example, Bolivian public officials seeking personal gain spent
$170 million to purchase a smelter from a German-Belgian
16
multinational company despite protests that it was not needed.1 It
was later revealed that the officials maling the purchase decision
had accepted bribe payments from the foreign supplier. 1 7 Since the
costly purchase, the smelter has never become operational."'

109.

See TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1.

110.

See id. Dieter Frisch, former Director-General of Development at the

European Commission notes that "when a country increases its indebtedness to
carry out projects which are not economically viable, the additional debt does not
only include the ten to twenty percent extra cost due to corruption; rather, the
entire investment . . . is attributable to dishonest decisions to proceed with
unproductive and unnecessary projects." Id.
111.
See Murphy, supranote 84, at 391.
112. Seeidat397.
113. See Leiken, Controlling the Global CorruptionEpidemic, supra note 4, at
70 ("Corruption begets unsafe buildings, bridges, water, and air and the
negligent, cynical government of inept officials."). The European Union Court of
Auditors reported that member states wasted $1.2 billion on fraudulent
infrastructure projects during 1996. See Almond & Syfert, supranote 55, at 435.
114. See Omestad et al., supranote 12, at 43.
115. This type of transaction is widely referred to as a "white elephant"
project.
116. See Boswell, supra note 61, at 184.
117. See id. As in most cases, the gain derived through individual profits
was greatly outweighed by the aggregate costs of the corrupt transaction. See id.
118. See id.
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Corruption magnifies social inequities by increasing the gap
between the wealthy and the underprivileged. While corrupt
officials benefit financially by channeling state funds into projects

that have neither social nor economic value, the general public
carries the burden of increased national debt but is privy to none
of the corresponding benefits.1 19 In Nigeria, considered by
businessmen to be among the most corrupt nations in the world,
oil revenues have enriched corrupt officials while the country's
farmers continue to work long hours without basic tools and
supplies. 120 Since the Nigerian oil boom, the country's per capita
income has declined significantly. 12 1 Commentators have
attributed this decline to a government which "takes the form of a
12 2
prodigious dispensation of corruption funded patronage."
2. Transnational Bribery Leads to Social Corrosion
As public officials become accustomed to receiving "tips" for
the performance of routine functions, basic entitlements
eventually become unavailable to a disenfranchised poor. 123 In
this way, the practice of bribery distorts how officials allocate the
resources and public goods they are responsible for
distributing.1 2 4 As bribery and corruption become increasingly
prevalent, state resources will be directed towards unproductive
areas, such as the police and the military, as the wealthy and the
elite become more concerned with the protection of their positions
and their material wealth.125 Thus, resources desperately needed
for socioeconomic development will instead be channeled into
12 6
security expenditures.
In addition, as barriers to trade and investment are reduced
in developing countries, increased competition and the advent of
technological advancements often lead to massive lay-offs of
workers by companies concerned with reducing costs and
119. See Kaltenheuser, supra note 106, at 8. See also Shihata, supra note
20, at 462. In short, corruption, in spite of some returns for its beneficiaries,

retards the overall development of societies and their systems of governance.
120. See Drug Trafficking Hearing, supra note 20, at 46. Although oil
currently contributes about eighty percent of Nigeria's revenue, Nigerians
themselves stand in mile-long fuel lines for gas due to unfinished pipe lines,
financed by loans from multilateral development banks pocketed by government

officials. See id. Rather than feeding the Nigerian citizenry, oil earnings line the
pockets of corrupt officials who promptly transfer their revenue to foreign banks.

See id
121.

Per capita GNP declined from $770 in 1983 to $320 in 1992. See id.

122.
123.
124.

Id.
See Salbu, supra note 31, at 250.
See id at 251.
See TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1.
See id.

125.

126.
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increasing efficiency. 1 27 As the elite reap the profits of an
increasingly global marketplace, the general citizenry is left
behind. Robert Leiken aptly states that "[a] climate that provides
hard times for some amid boom times for others has opened not
only a wage but also a credibility gap." 128 By widening the gap
between the rich and the poor, corruption "sows the seeds for
social and political tensions, threatens the very fabric of society
and undermines the effectiveness of the state and the political
12 9
legitimacy of government."
Moreover, when bribery is condoned in developing countries,
organized crime flourishes. 130 Poorly developed administrative
and political structures coupled with a lack of legal legitimacy

leave countries in a transitional stage of development particularly
vulnerable to widespread organized crime.13 1 As stated by Robert
Leiken: "Rent-seeking lives next-door to plunder. And corruption
is the silent partner of organized crime." 132 Public officials in
developing countries receiving exceedingly low wages often
succumb to large inducement payments offered by drug
traffickers and other organized crime groups to pass through
Customs or to avoid arrest or criminal prosecution. 13 3 Large cash
payments are frequently made to corrupt officials to compel them
to "overlook" criminal behavior.' 3 4 In developing countries, drug
money often competes with bribes from foreign businesses to line
the pockets of government officials.
When crime organizations are protected by the government in
return for bribe payments, organized crime groups may actually
merge with the state. 135 Nigerian crime rings net billions of
dollars by performing functions typically ascribed to the state,
such as issuing passports and other travel documents. 136 Once
organized crime groups infiltrate government structures and

127.

See Leiken, Controllingthe Global CorruptionEpidemic, supra note 4, at

59-60.
128. Id. at 60.
129.
Shihata, supranote 20, at 461 (quoting S. Rose-Ackerman, The Political
Economy of Corruption-Causesand Consequences, World Bank, Viewpoint Note
No. 74 (1996)).
130.
See Drug Trafficking Hearing,supranote 20, at 46.
131.
See generally EasternEurope Launches Purge on Ports Corruption, supra
note 5. See also Drug Trafficking Hearing, supra note 20, at 46. Overseas
corruption provides the indispensable nurturing habitat for criminal
organizations, protecting them from punishment and offering a stable
environment to thrive and to grow into international combines.
132.
Drug Trafficking Hearing,supranote 20, at 94.

133.
134.

See id
See TI SOURCE BOOK, supra note 15, ch. 2.

135.

See Drug Trafficking Hearing, supranote 20, at 97.

136.

See id.
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purchase - immunity from law enforcement agencies, they may
transform crime into the country's most profitable export.1 3 7 Iraq
and Cuba are modem examples of countries that have exported
political violence and tyranny for profit.138 Today, countries such
as Colombia, Russia, and China are considered by many to be
"crime-exporting countries." 139 Such countries often develop
efficient "shadow economies" that feature professional bribers who
provide entrepreneurs and foreign investors with access to the
bureaucracy.140 The problem is exacerbated when citizens become
aware of corruption within the government. When the public
believes the elite politicians and civil servants are accepting
bribes, they may see no reason why they, too, should not help
themselves to the riches by engaging in criminal conduct. 141
3. Corruption Threatens the Spread of Democratic Governments
and Market Economies Worldwide
Corruption undermines the legitimacy of democratic systems
of government and threatens the credibility of capitalism and freemarket economics. 142 When public officials are perceived as selfinterested and dishonest, public trust in the government
deteriorates and the rule of law is gradually subverted. 143 Officials
who receive windfalls through transnational bribery are not
accountable to their citizens. 14 4 As a result, governments that
already lack stability due to their transitional nature are further
weakened because they fail to maintain public trust and
145
credibility.

137.
See id.
138.
See id.
139.
Id.
140. Id. at 98.
141.
See TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1.
142.
See Leiken, Conrolling the Global CorruptionEpidemic, supranote 4, at 73
(The International Chamber of Commerce warned that corruption "could undermine

the most promising development of the post Cold-War era... the spread of democratic
governments and of market economies worldwide"). See generallyDonald J. Johnston,
The OECD and the Fight Against International Corruption, Opening Statements at the
Conference on Bribery in International Business Transactions (Nov. 6, 1996), available
at <http://www.oecd.org/newsand.events/release/nw9610>; JEFFREY P. BIALOS &
GREGORY HUsIsIAN, THE FOREIGN CORRuPr PRACTIcES Ac. COPING WITH CORRUPTION IN

TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 150-51 (1997).
143. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 342-43. See also TI SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 15, ch. 1 ("The public sees officials, and officials seem to see themselves, as

existing not to provide a service to the public, but as a body that is not
accountable to the public they profess to serve.").
144.
See Kantor, supranote 53, at 112.
145.
See id.
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Corruption and bribery become increasingly rampant during
transitional periods when nations abandon prior, more
centralized forms of government and adopt democratic
institutions and freer trade. In addition, bribery and corrupt

practices are increasingly reported to the public as censorship is
lifted and restraints on reporting are eliminated. 14 6 The public
perceives soaring levels of corruption, further undermining
support for political transition and market reform. 147 A public
opinion survey published by the U.S. Information Agency in 1995
indicated that majorities in Central and Eastern Europe perceive
increased corruption since the collapse of communism. 148
Similarly, a recent World Bank report found corruption to be one
of the most significant factors contributing to popular resistance
to market reform.149 Eventually, citizens may become so
disenchanted with changes to the government and perceived
increases in governmental corruption that they demand a
reversion to the prior form of government. 15 0
At the 1996 Conference on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, the Secretary-General of the OECD warned that as
the global community becomes increasingly aware of the
"tremendous harm caused by corruption," general confidence in
democratic government is threatened, particularly in new
democracies.' 5 ' Transparency International's efforts to reduce
transnational bribery have been based on the premise that "[if
corruption cannot be brought under control, it can threaten the
15 2
viability of democratic institutions and market economies."
Recently, the World Bank has become increasingly vocal in
cautioning that corruption, left unchecked, "may undermine
popular confidence in the public service to the degree that it may
provoke and provide the justification for violent changes of
government."' s3 If corruption persists, citizens in developing
countries may begin to assume that capitalism is inextricably

146.

See, e.g., Leiken, Controlling the Global CorruptionEpidemic, supranote

4, at 61 ("Crime and corruption usually went unreported in the Soviet bloc press,
and the lifting of censorship may have fed the widespread public impression of
soaring corruption.").
147. See generally TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1; Kantor, supranote
53.
148.

See Leiken, Controllingthe Global CorruptionEpidemic, supra note 4, at

149.
150.

See Nichols, supranote 1, at 349.
See id.

151.

Johnston, supranote 142.

152.

TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1.

153.

ROBIN THOEBALD,

61.

CORRUPTION,

DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

131 (1990) (quoting World Bank, World Development Report, at 17 (1983)).
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intertwined with corruption.1 5 4 Consequently, there is a real
danger that they may eventually reject capitalism and the
democratic form of government with which it is so often
associated. 15s
Public sentiment in the former Soviet bloc nations lends
support to this fear. According to a recent World Bank survey,
sixty-five percent of Russians believe that corruption is endemic

to capitalist systems and that they enjoyed a more favorable
standard of living under the past communist regime. 15 6 One
commentator has stated:
Angered by what they see as the corruption of their society by
these malignant manifestations [bribery and crime], many
Russians are turning against the notion of a market society. The
call for re-nationalization of some newly privatized gas, oil,
aluminum and military industries by a newly appointed official in
charge of privatization is but one reflection of that feeling .... The
danger is that the backlash against criminality could eventually
lead to the coming to power of a fascist leader or a 'man on a white
horse' pledged to throw out the thieves and restore law and order.
For many Russians that is becoming a more and more attractive
alternative. 157

Clearly, the continued growth of democratic forms of government
depends on the success of efforts to reduce transnational bribery
and systematic corruption.

IV. RECENT MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL
BRIBERY CONSIST ONLY OF "SOFT" LAW

As the costs associated with transnational corruption and
bribery have become increasingly intolerable to citizens and
governments around the globe, numerous organizations have
initiated multilateral efforts to proscribe illicit payments to foreign
officials. Thus far, almost all attempts to eliminate transnational
bribery have consisted only of "soft law," which is not legally
binding on the parties to the agreement.15 8 The movement to

154. See BIALos & HUsiSIAN, supranote 142, at 151.
155. See id.
156. See William Drozdiak, Justice Italian Style, Unleashed in Europe:
Investigating Judges Pursue Anti-Corruption Campaigns Against Politicians,
Businessmen, WASH. POST, July 25, 1994, at A12 (noting that bribery has
weakened public faith in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, and the citizens
have grown increasingly nostalgic about the "cast-off communist dictatorships").
157. BiALos & HUSISIAN, supranote 142, at 151 (quoting Marshall Goldman,
Comrade Godfather: In Russia, the Mafia Seizes the Commanding Heights of the
Economy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1995, at C2).
158. See Vogelson, supranote 36, at 198. See generally Nichols, supra note
1, at 354 (noting that governments "may not have sufficient resources or
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combat corruption has produced only two legally binding treaties
addressing the problem of transnational bribery. 159 The first of
these treaties, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
has only regional effect and lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism. 160 The more recent legally binding treaty is similarly
flawed. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions prohibits
only the supply side of bribery 16 1 and has not yet entered into
force.
Recent multilateral initiatives to contain transnational
bribery have demonstrated that interest in combating corrupt
business practices is on the rise. However, these recent initiatives
share two common weaknesses; they do not reach the entire
globe and they lack enforceability. 1 62 Most multinational attempts
to proscribe the bribery of foreign officials have been
163
characterized as voluntary codes or guidelines.
A. Efforts by InternationalOrganizationsto Proscribe
TransnationalBribery
1. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) cannot itself outlaw
transnational bribery because the rights and obligations it creates
apply only to member nations, not to persons, businesses, or
other entities. 164 The WTO has historically been successful in
165
negotiating detailed codes of conduct for its members.
Consistent with its historical success, the WTO negotiated a
Government Procurement Agreement, which entered into force on

opportunities to prosecute transnational bribery"); Stuart H. Deming, Foreign
Corrupt Practices,31 INT'L LAW 695, 698 (American Bar Assoc., 1997) (stating that
the "international action to date represents the evolution of 'soft' rather than
'hard' law").
159.
One critic has stated that "international measures addressing
corruption are still in their infancy." Shihata, supranote 20, at 469.
160.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 361. "[This Convention] contains no
means of forcing a reluctant country to act, and allows countries to reserve those
parts of the treaty with which they do not care to comply. Observers have already
begun to speculate as to the manner in which the treaty will be rendered
meaningless." Id.
161.
The "supply side" of bribery refers to the party making the illicit

payment. Under the OECD Convention, receiving a bribe is not criminalized.
162. See Nichols, supranote 1, at 360.

163.
164.

Seeid.at361.
See id. at 377.

165.

See id-
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January 1, 1996.166 Although this Agreement includes bidding
and procurement procedures designed to restrain corruption and
bribery, its success has been limited because implementation of
the Agreement would require substantial changes in domestic
laws and procedures of member countries. 16 7 Because adoption of
the Procurement Agreement is voluntary, rather than mandatory,
for WTO members, most countries have expressed an
unwillingness to adopt the Agreement. 168
Due to the failure of the Government Procurement Act, the
WTO addressed the need to combat corrupt practices in
international trade at the first biannual summit meeting held
early December, 1996, in Singapore. 16 9 The summit resulted in
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, which called for a working
group to study transparency in government procurement
practices, and to develop elements to be included in a future
agreement on transparency. 17 0 Although the WTO has just begun
addressing transnational bribery, commentators foresee an
increased role of the WTO in coordinating a global effort to combat
1
corruption in international business transactions. 17
2. The United Nations
The United Nations, through its Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), has taken recent steps to restrict
corruption in the conduct of international business. 172 UNCITRAL
adopted a Model Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction,
and Services (Model Law) on December 9, 1994.173 This Model
Law was "designed to promote transparency and objectivity in
public procurement proceedings." 174 If an offer or price quotation

166. See Almond & Syfert, supra note 55, at 441, 441 n.326 (citing
Agreement on Government Procurement, Jan. 1, 1981, GA7T B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) (1980) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981)).
167. See Kantor,supranote 53, at 117.
168. See id. Signatories are predominantly industrialized countries. Only
the United States, Canada, the EU member states, Israel, Japan, Norway, the
Republic of Korea, and Switzerland have signed the Government Procurement
Agreement. See id.
169. See Almond & Syfert, supranote 55, at 442.
170. See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, Dec. 13, 1996, art. 21,
reprintedin 36 I.L.M. 218, 226 (1997).
171.
See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 1, at 361-64, 377-78. (stating that the
WTO is in a unique position of being able to enforce codes of conduct).
172. See Deming, supranote 158, at 697.

173.

See id

174. Fourth Annual Report of Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On International Finance of the Senate Comm. On
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 145 (1996) [hereinafter Fourth
Annual Report Hearing].
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is accompanied by a bribe from a contractor or supplier, the
Model Law mandates that the offer or proposal be rejected.
Although the Model Law challenges bribery in the context of
procurement practices, by requiring heightened transparency in
accounting and increased objectivity in selecting bids, it serves
merely as advisory legislation, and has only been adopted by
Poland and Albania. 175
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC) was established to devise a specific policy challenging
corruption in international business transactions. In July, 1996,
ECOSOC adopted a proposal aimed to achieve this goal. 17 6 Both
of these proposals were subsequently adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1996. The "UN
Resolution on Action against Corruption" includes
an
"International Code of Conduct for Public Officials" (Code of

Conduct), which is intended to be used as a tool to guide the

77
efforts of Member States in fighting corruption.1
Under the UN Code of Conduct, "public officials shall at no
time improperly use public moneys, property, services or
information that is acquired in the performance of, or as a result
of, their official duties for activities not related to their official
work."' 7 8 Although the Code of Conduct recommends that
corporations maintain accurate accounting records and refrain
from making bribe payments, the Code is not legally binding in
any jurisdiction.' 7 9 Moreover, the UN failed to finalize the Code,
and it has never been adopted in any formal manner.' 8 0 In
addition to proposing the Code of Conduct, the Resolution on
Action Against Corruption calls upon the Secretary-General of the
UN to continue his studies of corruption in international business
transactions and to intensify his efforts to work with other UN
organs and nongovernmental organizations to coordinate anti8
corruption initiatives. ' 1
Also proposed by ECOSOC in July 1996, and adopted by the
General Assembly of the UN the following December, was the
"Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International

175. See id. at 145-46.
176. See Deming, supra note 158, at 698. For an outline of early UN
regulation of transnational bribery, see Muffler, supra note 7, at 10-11.
177. See G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 51st Sess., 82nd mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/51/610 (1996) reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1039, 1040-41 (1997)

[hereinafter G.A. Res. 51/59].
178. Id. at Annex, H(6). This code of conduct prohibits public officials from
accepting gifts and favors. See generally Salbu, supranote 3 1, at 234.
179. See Nichols, supranote 1, at 355-56.

180.
181.

See id.
Sde G.A. Res. 51/59, supranote 177, at 1041.
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Commercial Transactions." 182 This proposal called on Member
States "[t]o take effective and concrete action to combat all forms
of corruption, bribery and related illicit practices in international
commercial transactions," and to adopt appropriate business
codes and standards to prohibit bribery in connection with
international commercial transactions.1 8 3 Most importantly, the
proposal urged Member States to criminalize international bribery
and to proscribe the tax deductibility of bribes.1 8 4 While the
principles espoused in this proposal are bold, its implementation
and enforcement have been weak.
3. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
In recent years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) has emerged as the one of the strongest
vehicles for promoting clean business practices and catalyzing
anti-corruption reforms. The OECD is an intergovernmental
organization that facilitates the coordination of economic policies
among the world's twenty-seven wealthiest nations.185 OECD
countries export ninety percent of the world's goods and have
come to recognize that their companies supply many of the bribes
responsible for debilitating the global trading system as a
86
whole.,
Through the Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, OECD members have espoused their
intent to "promote good public and corporate governance, and to
prevent unfair competition
in international trade in
investment." 8 7 The OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) has also become involved in the OECD anti-corruption
campaign. The DAC has proposed a strategy to curb corruption in
bilateral aid-funded procurement that depends on the addition of
anti-corruption
provisions
in
aid-funded
procurement

182. See G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR 2nd Comm., 51st Sess., 86th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/51/601 (1996), reprintedin 36 ILM 1043 (1997).
183. Id. at 1046-47.
184. See id. See also Deming, supranote 158, at 698.
185. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 356; AID, OPIC, OECD Nomination
HearingsBefore the Senate ForeignRelations Comm., 105th Cong. (1997), available
in LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File (statement by Amy L. Bondurant, U.S.

Representative to the OECD) (stating that "29 industrialized democracies at the
OECD from North America, Europe, and Asia promote free market principles all
around the globe," and noting that the OECD has a unique capacity "to achieve
consensus on economic issues among the world's most advanced democracies").
186. See King, supranote 14, at 1; Johnston, supranote 142.
187. Johnston, supranote 142. OECD members have acknowledged that as

the world's leading trade countries, they have a responsibility for the integrity of
the multilateral trading system. See id.
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contracts.1 8 8 In addition, the Public Management Committee has
assisted OECD governments in assessing "their own strength[s]
and weakness[es]
in
protecting the integrity
of their
governments." 18 9 OECD anti-corruption efforts have been based
on the premise that, while each country is responsible for the
conduct of its companies abroad, a multilateral attack on corrupt
business practices will be more effective than uncoordinated
0

individual actions.19
On May 27, 1994, the OECD approved a Recommendation
that reflected an agreement among Member States that bribery
distorts international competitive conditions, that all countries

share a responsibility to reduce the role of bribery in international
commercial transactions, and that crirninalizing overseas bribery
is an aggressive step toward eradication. 191 A Working Group was
established under the auspices of the Committee on Investment
and Multinational Enterprises to track the progress attributable
to the Recommendation. 192 Although the 1994 Recommendation
demonstrates the intent of each member to honor its commitment
to initiate effective action against international corruption vis 5L
vis the other OECD members, the Recommendation is not legally
binding on member countries.19 3 The only enforcement
mechanisms granted by the Recommendation are monitoring and
19 4
peer pressure by OECD member states.

188. See id.
189. Id. The Public Management Committee has developed the concept of
an "ethics infrastructure" to assist in cleaning up the governments of Member
States. Id.
190. See id. The OECD has stated that "it is not enough just to agree on the
laws we should adopt. We must also make sure that every country enforces its
law." Id. The OECD also stresses that cooperation with the private sector in the
fight against corruption is crucial to the potential success of such efforts. See id.
191.
OECD, Council Recommendation on Bribery in International Business
Transactions, C(94) 75/FINAL, May 27, 1994, reprintedin 33 T.L.M. 1389, 139091 (1994). See generally Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Fourteenth
International Symposium on Economic Crime: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 509, 52728 (1997).
192. See Rossbacher & Young, supra note 191, at 528. The anti-bribery
working group within the OECD met in the autumn of 1994 and held a
symposium in March, 1995. See Earle, supra note 5, at 276. The group also
prepared a collection of questions to which member countries were asked to
respond. See id. Several countries followed through and completed the requested
responses. See id193. See Johnston, supranote 142; see also, Earle, supra note 5, at 225-26
(noting that Japan and several European nations objected to U.S. efforts to make
the recommendation legally binding).
194. See id
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first
anti-bribery
Two
years
after
issuing
its
Recommendation, the OECD took its first significant step towards
eradicating the practice of transnational bribery. 19s The OECD
Council adopted the Recommendation on Tax Deductibility of
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials 1 9 6 in April, 1996. This
Recommendation called on Members that provide tax deductions
for bribes to foreign officials to "reexamine such treatment with
the intention of denying this deductibility." 197 Because more than
half of the OECD Member States treat transnational bribery as a
tax deductible business expense, this Recommendation addressed
a critical obstacle to the successful elimination of bribery
abroad. 198 In May, 1996, the OECD Council met at the Ministerial
level and committed itself to criminalizing bribery "in an effective
and coordinated manner."19 9 The Council eventually reached a
consensus on the measures that should be taken and in 1997
recommended steps each member country should take toward
criminalizing bribery.20 0 Responsibility for monitoring the
implementation of the Recommendation was delegated to the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs, working in concert with the
Committee on International Investment and Multinational
20
Enterprises.
Since the adoption of this Recommendation, individual OECD
Members have made only limited progress towards prohibiting the
tax deductibility of bribes to foreign officials. 2 ° 2 By the end of 1997,
only Norway had eliminated the practice.2 0 3 Belgium, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and Australia had measures
20 4
pending in their legislatures to eliminate such tax deductions.
Several countries, including Germany, Austria, and France, have
stated that they will not take action to eliminate the tax deductibility

195. See Kantor, supranote 53, at 114-15.
196. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials, C(96)27/FINAL, Apr. 11, 1996, reprinted in 35
I.L.M. 1311, 1311 (1996) [hereinafter OECD, C(96)27/FINAL].
197. Id. at 1312.

198.

See Kantor, supranote 53, at 115.

199. OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council on Combatting Bribery
in International Business Transactions, C(97)123/FINAL, May 23, 1997, reprinted
in 36 I.L.M. 1018, 1018 (1997) [hereinafter OECD, C(97)123/FINAL].
200. Seeid.at 1019.
201. See OECD, C(96)27/FINAL, supra note 196, at 1312.
202. Over half of the 26 OECD members still permit corporations to take
tax deductions for bribes paid to foreign officials. See Almond & Syfert, supranote
55, at 438-39.
203. See The Fifth Annual Report on the Status of the National Export
Strategy: Hearings Before the Senate Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs Comm.,
105th Cong. (1997) availablein LEXIS, LEGIS Library, CNGTST File (statement of
William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce).
204. See id.
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of bribes until the issue of criminalization is decided. 20 5 These
countries have resisted efforts directed at eliminating tax deductions
based on the fear that doing so would threaten the ability of national
companies to compete for contracts in the international community.
Practical implementation of the Recommendation on Tax

Deductibility of Bribes has proven to be more difficult
than reaching
20 6

a consensus on the principles embodied within it.
The issue of transnational bribery of foreign officials was
addressed again at the June, 1996 G-7 Summit in Lyon,
France. 20 7 In Lyon, the G-7 declared its support of ongoing efforts
in other multilateral organizations to combat bribery.2 0 8 The
summit "resolved to combat corruption in international business
transactions," recognized the OECD Ministers' commitment to
criminalize international bribery, and urged the OECD to further
examine the appropriate international modalities to facilitate the
criminalization of bribery.2 0 9 The summit suggested that
additional proposals for action be considered in 1997.210
In May, 1997, the OECD responded to support from the G-7 by
adopting a Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in
211
International Business Transactions (Revised Recommendation).
This Revised Recommendation called for "effective measures to deter,
prevent, and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in
connection with international business transactions."2 12 In
particular, the Revised Recommendation advocated "the prompt
criminalization of such bribery in an effective and co-ordinated
manner and in conformity with the agreed common elements set out
in... [the Revised] Recommendation and with the jurisdictional and
other basic legal principles of each country."2 3 The Revised
Recommendation also urged Member states to take prompt action to
implement the 1996 Recommendation requiring reexamination of the
issue of tax-deductibility of foreign bribe payments.2 1 4 Perhaps the

205.

See id.

206.

Robert

Leiken has noted

that practical

implementation

of the

Recommendation is "a more difficult and more critical stage." Drug Trafficking
Hearing, supranote 20, at 103.
207.
See id208.
See Kantor, supra note 53, at 115.
209. Making a Success of Globalization for the Benefit of All, G7 Economic
Communiqud (June 28, 1996) § 26.
210.
See id.
211.
OECD, C(97)123/FINAL.
212.
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, pmbl., available at
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/20novle.htm>
[hereinafter
OECD
Convention].
213.
Id.
214.
OECD Recommendation C(97)123/FINAL, supra note 199, at 1019.
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most significant aspect of the Revised Recommendation was the

decision to draft an international convention to criminalize
the
bribery.2 1 5 This treaty was planned to be open for signature by
2 16
end of 1997, with the goal of its entry into force within one year.
As promised, the OECD convened in December, 1997 to sign
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions (Convention).2 17 The
Convention had been adopted by the OECD Negotiating
Conference on November 21, 1997, and was subsequently signed
by OECD Ministers in Paris about three weeks later.2 18 Under
this legally binding treaty, cross-border bribes will become an
international crime. 2 19 Britain, Hungary, Germany, and Argentina
were the first countries to sign the accord, described by OECD
Secretary-General Donald Johnston as a "major success" in "the
important fight against international corruption."2 20 French
Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Jacques Dondoux, stated
that the Convention marked "the first time that the international
community, or at least all the industrial countries, have adopted
an operational1 instrument to fight effectively against international
22
corruption."
The OECD Convention reflects three basic premises. 22 2 First,
there are two parties to every bribe: the donor and the recipient
of the payment. 2 23 Second, economic markets and public morality
do not always coincide. 2 24 Third, new rules governing
international business 5will lead to "tougher but fairer competition"
22
in the global market.

215.

Id.

216.
217.
218.

See id.
See OECD Convention, supranote 212, preamble.
See Sue Kendall, Industrial Countries Sign Anti-Bribery Pact, Agence

France Presse, Dec. 17, 1997, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, AFP File.
219. See Suchada Kulawat, Analysis/killing Off Graft: Securing Global
Remedies to a Worldwide Curse, BANGKOK PosT, Dec. 18, 1997, at 8, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, BNGPST File.
220. Kendall, supranote 218.

221. Id. German Economy Minister Guenter Rexrodt saw the agreement as
"a signal to the world that 'the international community will not let corruption
damage or endanger the progress made on liberalizing world trade.'" Id.
222. For general discussion of the Convention's import, see Riyaz Dattu &
John Boscariol, OECD Countries to Implement Domestic Legislation to Combat
Bribery in International Transaction, INTER-PAc. B. Ass'N J., Mar. 1998, available at
<http://www.mccarthy.ca/oecd.html>; Madeleine K. Albright, Statement at the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Signing Ceremony of
the Anti-Bribery and Corruption Convention (Dec. 17, 1997), available at
<http://www.state.gov/www/statements/971217b.html>.
223. See Kulawat, supranote 219, at 8.
224. See id.
225. Id.
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Despite the Convention's early fanfare, the treaty offers only a
partial solution to the problem of transnational bribery. As stated
by Peter Eigen, chairman of Transparency International, "[tihis is
only one tool in a whole tool kit of measures to deal with
corruption."2 2 6 The scope of the Convention is relatively limited.
Article 1 defines the "Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials"
as the intentional offer, promise, or gift of any undue pecuniary or
other advantage by any person to a foreign public official in order
to persuade the official to "act or refrain from acting in relation to
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
2 27
international business."
The definition of the offense of criminal bribery is clearly
under-inclusive. The treaty addresses only "active bribery,"
defined as "the offence committed by the person who promises or
gives the bribe, as contrasted with 'passive bribery,' the offence
committed by the official who receives the bribe."2 2 8 Thus,
penalties are imposed only on the companies in OECD countries
paying out money. Corrupt officials who receive illicit payments
are not penalized, as this would constitute interference in a
2 29
foreign country's sovereignty.
Bribes issued to private companies in foreign countries are
also not covered by the Convention. 230 Moreover, facilitation
payments are not an offense under the Convention because they
"do not constitute payments made to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage.' "231 Rather, facilitation payments are
typically made to induce public officials to perform routine
functions, such as issuing licenses or permits. 2 3 2 Furthermore,
bribes made to political parties or party officials fall outside the
scope of the Convention and are not prohibited. 23 3 Countries

226.

Id

227.

OECD Convention, supranote 212, art. 1, para. 1.

228.
OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery in
International Business
Transactions (Nov.
21,
1997)
available at
<http://wwv.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/2Onov2e.htm>
[hereinafter
OECD,
Commentaries].
229.
See Kendall, supranote 218.
230.
See id231. OECD, Commentaries, supra note 228 (quoting OECD Convention,
supranote 212, art. 1, para. 1).
232.
See id.
233.
See Kendall, supra note 218. U.S. Secretary of Commerce William
Daley has criticized this aspect of the Convention and has suggested that a
Convention condoning bribes to political machines, such as Zaire's Mobutu Sese
Seko or the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, will be only marginally effective. See
Daley, supranote 19, at 22.
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such as Germany and France have argued that condemning
bribes to political parties would pose constitutional problems due
to a lack of similar specific legislation for their own political
both a shared concern
parties. 2 34 OECD members have expressed
23 5
and an intent to address this problem.
The OECD has worked to convince nonmembers to sign the
Convention,

as

well. 23 6

So

far, five

non-OECD

countries,

Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic, have
adopted the treaty.23 7 In doing so, these countries have
demonstrated their intent to abide by the new rules governing
international business. However, the Convention is not expected
to enter into force until 1999.238 The Convention will enter into
force when one of two scenarios occurs. First, if at least five of the
ten largest OECD economies, representing at least sixty percent of
total OECD exports, ratify the Convention by the end of 1998, the
Convention will immediately enter into force. 2 3 9 If the required
number of OECD countries have not passed enabling legislation
at the
by the end of 1998, the Convention will enter into 2force
40
start of 1999, as long as two countries have ratified it.
Signatories were obligated to submit the Convention to their
legislatures for ratification by April 1, 1998.241 Because the

Convention is not self-executing, signatories must enact
implementing laws that criminalize bribery in a manner
consistent with terms of the Convention. 24 2 The Convention's
potential to successfully establish a multilateral anti-corruption

regime will be realized only if signatories are able to achieve
prompt

234.

ratification,

full

implementation,

and

appropriate

See Kendall, supranote 218.

235.
See id. The OECD has agreed to continue work on this issue and has
stated that the issue will be visited again at the next OECD ministerial meeting in

early 1998. See id.
236.
See OECD, Commentaries, supra note 228 (discussing the OECD
Convention, supra note 212, art.13). The OECD has appealed to nonmembers to
adhere to the 1997 OECD Revised Recommendation and to participate in the
OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. See id.
Nonmembers that participate in the Working Group are eligible to sign the OECD

Convention. See id. The current procedures governing participation by non-OECD
members in the Working Group may be found in the Resolution of the Council
concerning the Participation of Non-Member Economies in the Work of Subsidiary
Bodies of the Organisation, C(96)64/REV1/FINAL. See id.
237. See Kulawat, supra note 219, at 8.
238. See Kendall, supra note 218.
239. See OECD Convention, supranote 212, art. 15, para. 1.
240. See id- at art. 15, para. 2.
241.
See Lucinda A. Low & Michael L. Burton, Anti-Bribery Pact: Corruption
Is Target of MultilateralEfforts, NAT'L L.J. (New York), May 4, 1998, at C5.
242. See id.
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enforcement. 2 43 In the United States, the Convention must be
ratified and implementing legislation must then be enacted by
Congress to ensure that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
brought into conformity with the Convention. 2 44 On May 1, 1998,
a month after the target date of April 1, President Clinton
submitted the Convention to the Senate with a recommendation
that the Senate "give early and favorable consideration to the
Convention, and that it give its advice and consent to
245
ratification."
Although the Convention will become legally binding after
December 31, 1998, as long as at least two signatories have
ratified it, "such a limited endorsement would be tantamount to a
major failure of the entire process."2 46 The ability of the
Convention to achieve its goals depends upon ratification by the
maximum number of countries. 2 47 Since no country will want to
be the first to subject itself to stricter regulation, "it is vital that
all 34 countries act swiftly and simultaneously in ratifying the
2 48
convention."
B. The Role of MultilateralDevelopments Banks
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB) play an important
role in the crusade against transnational bribery since they
control funds that may potentially be used by borrowers to engage
in corrupt business practices. 2 4 9 Both the NAFTA-created North
American Development Bank (NADBank) and the World Bank
have recently instituted policies to discourage transnational

243. See id.
244. See id. The Convention repeats many principles already addressed by
the FCPA, but Senate ratification will require the amendment of the FCPA in
several respects to ensure consistency between the two overlapping laws. See id.
245. Clinton Letter to Senate on Convention of Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in InternationalBusiness Transactions,U.S. Newswire, May 1, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 5685396.
246. Transparency International, OECD Convention Update: Ratification
Process Enters Crucial Phase (March 4, 1998) <http://www.transparency.de/
press/ 1998.3.4oecd-update.htnl>.
247. See id.
248. Id.
249. The Development Committee of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund released a report addressing international bribery in March,
1996. See Kantor, supra note 53, at 119. In this report the Development
Committee Task Force "emphasized the MDB's important role in helping member
countries create and maintain an environment of effective government and a
strong civil society, including a reliable framework of rules and institutions." Id.
The report also recommended that MDB's coordinate procurement policies and
rules. See id.
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bribery in the context of MDB-funded projects. MDB policies
intended to limit opportunities for borrowers to engage in corrupt
transactions generally consist of anti-bribery provisions in loan
and procurement contracts and the requirement that corporate
borrowers have policies in place that prohibit bribery.
1. North American Development Bank
NADBank has adopted guidelines that require companies to
certify that they have not engaged in bribery of government
officials in NADBank-funded projects. 25 0 In addition, borrowing
companies must assert that they have not been convicted of
1
bribery within the five year period prior to such certification. 25
Corporate policies prohibiting bribery are a prerequisite to
receiving NADBank funds, and companies that are found to
engage in bribery may be barred from future eligibility for
2 S2
involvement in NADBank-funded or guaranteed projects.
2. World Bank
Efforts by the World Bank to restrain bribery in international
business transactions have focused on increasing transparency
and clarifying bidding procedures.2 5 3 In 1995, the World Bank
issued revised procurement rules intended to strengthen
transparency and began requiring the use of Standard Bidding
Documents in bidding procedures.25 4 Preventing bribery and

corruption was the overriding goal of these revisions. 2 55 In July
1997, the World Bank approved anti-bribery amendments to the
loan conditions, procurement rules, and standard bidding
documents.2 5 6 Pursuant to these amendments, the Bank will
reject a contract bid or cancel a loan if the bidder or the borrower
has engaged in fraud or corruption in the procurement or

250. See id at 116.
251. See id.
252. See id Companies convicted for transnational bribery are precluded
from participating in NADBank-funded projects. See id.
253. See FourthAnnual Report Hearing,supranote 174, at 146. The World Bank
is required by its Articles of Agreement "to ensure that the proceeds of its loans will be
used only for the purposes for which they are granted and to disburse its loans only as
expenditures on the projects it finances are actually incurred." INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, Feb. 16, 1989, Art. Il, §

5(c), availableat <http://www.worldbankorg/html/extdr/arttoc.htm>.
254. See FourthAnnual Report Hearing,supranote 174, at 146.
255. See Deming, supranote 158, at 698.
256. See id.at 699.
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execution of the contract. 25 7 Offending companies found will be
denied the right to participate in future Bank-funded projects. 2 58
To strengthen the policy laid out in the anti-bribery
amendments, the World Bank employed specific language to
address corrupt practices in the recently revised Guidelines for

Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits. Section 1.15
mandates that borrowers, bidders, suppliers, and contractors
under World Bank-financed contracts "observe the highest
standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of such
contracts."2 5 9 In furtherance of anti-corruption policy goals, the
Guidelines provide the World Bank with "the right to require that
contracts financed by a World Bank loan, a provision be included
requiring Suppliers and Contractors" to cooperate in World Bank
inspections and audits of "accounts and records relating to the
performance of the [World Bank-financed] contract."2 60 The
policies outlined in the Guidelines apply only to contracts for
goods and works financed, at least partially, by World Bank
26 1
Loans.
In looking towards the future, World Bank management has
identified several reforms necessary to successfully control the
spread of corruption. First, economic policy reforms and
2 62
institutional reforms are needed in developing countries.
Second, the Bank must heighten its fiduciary responsibilities in
connection with funded projects. 2 63 Finally, the Bank must
enhance its supervision of procurement practices. 2 64 This
requires increased procurement staffing, more rigorous review of
procurement by headquarters, and limited delegation of oversight
2 65
to field offices.

257.
258.

See id.
See id. These companies may be blacklisted from participation in

Bank-funded contracts either indefinitely or for a stated time period. See id.
259.

GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA CREDITS, § 1.15,

availableat <http://www.worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/intro.htl>.
260. IcL at§ 1.15(e).
261. Denting, supranote 158, at 699. For the procurement of contracts for
goods and works which are not funded by a Bank loan, the borrower may adopt
other methods which ensure that the project will be carried out in a diligent and
efficient manner. See id.
262. See Kantor, supranote 53, at 118.
263. See id.
264. See id

265.

See id.
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C. RegionalInitiatives to ProscribeTransnationalBribery
Efforts by regional organizations to curb transnational
bribery at the supranational level have become increasingly
aggressive in recent years. Organizations such as the Council of
Europe, the European Parliament, the Council of Securities
Regulators of the Americas (COSRA), and the Organization of
American States (OAS) have initiated numerous reforms aimed at
eliminating corruption in international business transactions.
While regional organizations cannot proscribe bribery globally, the
measures they implement send a message to the world that
corrupt business practices will not be tolerated. In addition, they
combat bribery on a more manageable scale and add momentum
to the global campaign against corruption.
1. Council of Europe
In June of 1994, the Council of Europe adopted a
multifaceted program addressing corruption in transnational
business. 2 66 Under this program, the Council of Europe
established a multidisciplinary group on corruption (GMC) "to
promote research projects, training programs, and exchanges in
practical experiences on corruption."2 67 The GMC's initial report
contained a series of anti-corruption recommendations, including
"proposed legal reforms that would alter existing administrative,
2 68
tax, civil, commercial, and criminal laws in most countries."
Public and private codes of conduct and sanctions for illicit
payments were also discussed.2 6 9 However, the keystone of the
GMC report was a recommendation that corruption should
become a "punishable offense irrespective of the place where it
was committed and of the country to which the official to whom
2 70
the illegal payment was made belonged."

266.
See Deming, supranote 158, at 696.
267.
Id.
268. Id. at 697.
269.
See id. at 696.
270.
Id. at 697 (quoting Paolo Bernasconi, New Criminal Law Provisions
Against the Corruption of Public Officials: Analysis of the Gaps in Substantive Law,
Procedural and InternationalMutual Assistance; Proposals for Remedying Them,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY GROUP ON CORRUPTION,

at 10 (Dec. 31,

1994)). The GMC report found that the "time is therefore ripe to consider revising
national criminal legislation along the lines of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
which has been in force in the United States since December 19, 1977." Id.
(quoting Bernasconi, supra).
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2. European Parliament
Efforts to combat the bribery of public officials have also been
endorsed by the European Parliament. In December, 1995, the
European Parliament adopted the Report of the Committee on
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on Combating Corruption in
Europe (Report).27 1 This report was based on the notion that the
increasing internationalization of trade, coupled with inadequate
criminal and legal provisions to prevent corruption, will probably
result in corrupt practices at the international level. 2 72 In the
Report, the GMC recommended that "Member States abolish any
tax legislation and other legal provisions or rules which indirectly
encourage corruption and make it a punishable offense for
national or foreign officials and decision-makers to be granted or
2 73
to accept advantages."
3. Council of Securities Regulators of the Americas
As European organizations have displayed a new willingness
to reconsider the legality of international bribery, organizations
representing the Americas have taken concrete steps toward the
criminalization of corrupt business practices. At the Fifth Annual
Meeting of COSRA, on June 20-21, 1996, the organization
adopted a Resolution on Combating Illicit Payments by Public
Companies (Public Company Resolution).2 74 The Public Company
Resolution calls on member countries to use their best efforts to
"develop and promote laws that address illicit payments made by
public companies."7 5 In addition, the Public Company Resolution
calls for the development and promotion of independent auditing

271.
Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on
Combating Corruption in Europe, EUR PARL Doc., (EN A4-314) 3 (1995)

[hereinafter Combating Corruption Report].
272.
273.

See Deming, supranote 158, at 697.
Combatting Corruption Report, supranote 271, at 5.

274.
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997:
OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE SEC'S INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, AND
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES 840, available in WESTLAW 980 PLI/ Corp

747 [hereinafter THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997]. "COSRA was founded by securities
regulators to promote market integrity through the development of high
regulatory standards throughout the region." Ic- COSRA is gradually enlarging
and the ranks of its members include countries at various levels of market
development. See ic- COSRA "has advanced compatible regulatory structures in
the Americas by endorsing principles of cooperation, enforcement and oversight
that commits its members to the development of safe, fair and transparent
markets." Id
275.
Id. at 841.
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procedures capable of detecting illicit payments and slush
76
funds.

2

The Public Company Resolution was supplemented by a

Declaration on Combating Bribery in the Americas. 2 77 This
declaration was adopted by seventeen countries on June 20,
1996.278 In this declaration, members stated their intention to
enforce laws addressing illicit payments made to domestic and
foreign public officials. 2 79 The declaration demonstrated a
commitment to the "vigilant oversight of public companies," based
on appropriate independent auditing procedures that provide
"reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities
including those that may result from illegal acts such as
28 0
bribery."

4. Organization of American States
The most comprehensive attack against international
corruption has been the product of initiatives undertaken by the
OAS. 2 8 1 Comprised of more than thirty countries in North and
South America, the OAS issued its first resolution proscribing
corrupt practices in 1992.282 Thereafter, a Working Group was
established to examine the role of integrity and civil ethics in
international trade. On June 1, 1994, a second resolution
concerning bribery in international trade was adopted by the
28 3
General Assembly of the OAS.

Efforts by the OAS to eradicate transnational bribery
culminated in the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption

276.
See id.; see also Nichols, supranote 1, at 359.
277.
This Declaration is reprinted in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1997, supra note
274, at 858-59.
278.
See id. at 859. The Declaration has been adopted by: Argentina,
Brazil, Canada-Ontario, Canada-Quebec, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. See id.
279.
Declaration on Combating Bribery in the Americas, reprinted in THE
SEC SPEAKS IN 1997, supranote 274, at 858-59.
280. Id. at 858.
281.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 359. See generally Lucinda A. Low,
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice Report to the
House of Delegates: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, 31 INT'L LAW.
1121 (1997) (discussing the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
created by the OAS and why the ABA supports the Convention).
282.
Nichols, supranote 1, at 358.
283. See Vogelson, supra note 36, at 197. This resolution stated that
"corrupt practices are capable of frustrating the process of overall development,
generating the diversion of resources necessary to the improvement of the
economic and social conditions of the people." Id.
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(OAS Convention).2 8 4 This treaty was adopted and opened for
signature on March 29, 1996, in Caracas, and was eventually
signed by twenty-one nations.2 8 5 The OAS Convention represents
the first legally binding treaty addressing the issue of
transnational bribery. 28 6 Pursuant to the treaty, signatories are
required to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials and to allow
extradition of both bribe-givers and officials who have accepted
bribe payments. 28 7 In addition to criminalizing the receipt of
bribes by public officials, signatories must make it a crime for
public officials to possess or acquire assets "that he cannot
reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the
performance of his functions. "28 8 The OAS Convention provides
mutual legal assistance in investigations of corruption, and orders
the seizure and forfeiture of illicit gains.2 8 9 The treaty is open for
accession by any state willing to uphold the principles it
2 90
espouses.

284.

Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention Against

Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 724, 724 (1996) [hereinafter
Inter-American Convention].
285.
See id. The following OAS Member States signed the Convention:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,

Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See id.
286.
See Nichols, supra note 1, at 359. The purpose of the treaty is "[t]o
promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure
the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate
corruption in the performance of public functions and acts of corruption
specifically related to such performance." Inter-American Convention, supra note
284, art. II, § 2, at 728. The U.S. State Department praised the Inter-American
Convention as "the first anti-corruption treaty instrument in the world" and has
predicted that it may catalyze the criminalization of transnational bribery in other
fora. Drug Trafficking Hearing,supranote 20, at 106 (quoting an anonymous State
Department source).
287.
See Inter-American Convention, supra note 284, arts. VII, XIII, at 730,
731.
288.
Inter-American Convention, supranote 284, art. IX, at 730 (describing
the crime of "illicit enrichment").
289.
See Alan P. Larson (U.S. Asst. Secretary of State for Economic &
Business Affairs), Editoria: Leadership Needed to Fight Corruption, THE HINDU,
May 9, 1997, at 12.
290.
See Inter-American Convention, supranote 284, art. XXIII, at 733. The
Convention "shall remain open for accession by any other state." Id. The
accession by states outside the region is one way of expanding the reach of the
Convention's measures against transnational bribery. See Drug Trafficking
Hearing, supra note 20, at 106. See also Sutton, supra note 85, at 1429 (arguing
that the Inter-American Convention "offers the most effective approach to
combating corruption and that all states should sign and ratify it").
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V. PROPOSED MEASURES TO REDUCE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY AND
PROMOTE CLEAN PRACTICES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
IN DEVELOPING NATIONS
The

business

rising

costs

associated

transactions

have

with

corrupt

precipitated

international

anti-corruption

movements all over the world. 2 9 1 Popular attacks on corruption
have been launched in countries as diverse as Argentina,

Cambodia, Italy, Hungary, Pakistan, Switzerland, Thailand, and
Zimbabwe.2 9 2 Today, corruption is being challenged by a diverse
collection of opposition parties. Religious groups, the press,
nongovernmental organizations, and civil servants have banded

together in the campaign against corruption. 2 93 The repudiation
of bribery and kickbacks by societies that once tolerated them has

been characterized as a "revolution in public opinion."2 9 4 This
setting presents the unprecedented opportunity to implement
effective reforms capable of significantly reducing transnational

bribery.
A. Addressing the Causes of Corruption

For

anti-corruption

reforms

to

successfully

control

transnational bribery, they must be based on an understanding of
the causes of corruption. Economists Andrei Shleifer of Harvard
University and Robert W. Vishny of the University of Chicago have
295
identified several factors that typically accompany corruption.
They claim that the existence of underpaid public officials,
monopoly regimes, and inadequate governmental oversight are
indicators of corrupt government.2 9 6 These three factors will be
2 97
discussed below.

291. See generally Leiken, An End to Corruption, supranote 4, at AIS.
292. See id. Anti-corruption movements have also emerged in Saudi Arabia,
El Salvador, South Korea, Taiwan, Tanzania, and New Zealand. See id.
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. See Pennar et al, supranote 62, at 138 (stating that these economists
believe a lack of economic and political competition promotes corruption); see also
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. OF ECON. 599 (1993)
(proposing a mathematical model of corruption to show the high cost of
corruption for poor nations, more costly even than high taxation). Shleifer and
Vishny are American economists who act as advisers to the Russian government.
Bribonomics, supranote 100, at 86.
296. See Pennar et al, supra note 62, at 138. When the chances of getting
caught and being punished are low, and an honest day's work results in a very
low income, accepting bribes is more likely to seem reasonable. See id. In
addition, "chaotic conditions and weak governments [allow] new corruption
opportunities to arise." Haque & Sahay, supra note 59, at 762. Empirical studies
of bureaucratic corruption have pointed to three primary factors predictive of the
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Direct evidence of a negative correlation between public
wages and corruption was provided by a recent econometric study
conducted by Van Rijckeghem and Weder.2 9 8 An analysis of a
twenty country sample over the 1982-1994 time period revealed
that the ratio of civil service wages to manufacturing wages was a
significant predictor of the corruption index. 2 99 In the sample
countries, the correlation between these relative wages and the
corruption index exceeded eighty percent. 30 0 In addition, the
evidence demonstrated that corruption is more common in
countries with poorly developed administrative systems and
institutions and low government wages. 30 1
Low paid public officials are particularly vulnerable to
engaging in bribery when they enjoy monopoly power over a
government service. 3 °2 By definition, officials with monopoly
power often have unbridled discretion in the use of their
authority. Thus, monopoly control confers the power to charge a
higher than optimal price for a service while providing less of
it.3 0 3 When officials do not enjoy monopoly power over services,
requests for bribes will decline and parties will instead seek the
services of another official who either does not demand a bribe or
who asks for a lesser amount.3 0 4 Officials that enjoy limited
monopoly control will be careful to demand small
bribes to
305
prevent potential customers from being scared off.

The connection between poor oversight of public officials and
corruption is more intuitive. A lack of accountability allows the
official to use his authority to promote his own interests above
that of the public he represents. When pervasive corruption
within the government leads officials to believe they are entitled to

illicit payments as a supplement to low wages, the fear of
degree of corruption: opportunities, low salaries, and poor policing. See id. This
result seems consistent with Shleifer and Vishny's hypothesis.
297.

Robert Klitgaard, a scholar in the field of transnational corruption, has

proposed a rough formula for corruption which incorporates a similar
understanding of the factors leading to corruption. See Robert Klitgaard, What
Can Be Done?, UNESCO COURIER (Fr.), June 1996, at 34, 35. Under Klitgaard's
formula, corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. See

id.
298. See Haque & Sahay, supra note 59, at 761.
299. See id. A panel data estimation procedure was used. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id. While scholars, such as Tanzi, have argued that developing
countries have a higher propensity for corruption than industrial countries due to
cultural differences, this theory has generally been discredited. See id.
302. See Bribonomics,supranote 100, at 86.
303. See Klitgaard, supranote 292, at 35.
304. See Bribonomics, supranote 100, at 86.
305. See id.
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punishment may, be the only mechanism with the potential to
prevent the acceptance of bribes.
Thus, a strategy to effectively combat transnational bribery
must ensure that public officials are adequately compensated
while demanding increased accountability in return. In addition,
a successful anti-corruption strategy must attempt to mitigate
monopoly control by encouraging healthy economic competition.
B. Elements of a Comprehensive Strategy to
Control TransnationalBribery
This section will outline the issues that must be addressed in a
comprehensive anti-corruption reform aimed at curbing the bribery
of foreign officials in international commercial transactions. An
effective solution to the problem of transnational bribery cannot be
developed overnight, nor can it be achieved through one treaty. A
successful strategy will require a commitment from the international
community to criminalize bribery and to eliminate the factors that
contribute to its proliferation. A successful approach must include
legally binding rules, realistic enforcement measures, and constant
monitoring. More importantly, a comprehensive campaign against
transnational bribery requires participation from developing and
transitional economies, in addition to the efforts of the industrialized
world.
An international convention that legally binds signatories is
long overdue. Foreign corrupt practices are an international
problem requiring an international solution.3 0 6 The effectiveness
of a potential convention is contingent upon acquiring a broad
base of participation, including not only the wealthy OECD
member states, but also less-developed countries. The exclusion
of developing countries from participation in an anti-bribery
convention ensures that only half of the problem will be
addressed. A successful convention must proscribe both active
and passive bribery. In other words, both making a bribe payment
and receiving such a payment must be criminal offenses under
the convention.
For the treaty to influence the actions of parties to
international business transactions, it must be backed up by
effective enforcement. Some scholars have proposed that the WTO
is a capable enforcement vehicle, while others have suggested

306.

See Lloyd N. Cutler & Daniel M. Drory, Toward an InternationalCode on

Illicit Payments, in EMERGING STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT

33, 40 (Seymour J. Rubin & Gary Clyde Hufbauer eds., 1984) (stating that "[iut is
necessary to have international measures that match the international
dimensions of this problem [of foreign bribery]").
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establishing a private cause of action.3 0 7 The establishment of an
independent policing agency is another viable alternative.
Sanctions for infringement should include punitive fines and
prison sentences. 30 8 Further, the success of the convention in
accomplishing the underlying goals should be periodically
evaluated. A timeline, including measurable goals, should be the

benchmark for comparison.
To facilitate the detection of illicit payments, heightened
transparency in corporate accounting is required. Uniform
financial disclosure standards aimed at preventing corporate
slush funds must be adopted, and random audits by an
independent agency should be instituted. Open procurement
procedures would reduce opportunities for corrupt transactions.
In addition, offers or requests for bribes should be subject to
mandatory reporting, and incentives and safeguards should be
provided for "whistle blowers." Illicit enrichment should invoke
confiscation of funds, as well as criminal sanctions.
Individual countries must act to eliminate the underlying
causes of bureaucratic corruption. This will involve restructuring
incentives to public officials and increasing accountability.3 0 9
Organizational objectives and methods to measure success should
be established. Compensation scales must be restructured, so
that officials are rewarded for the achievement of identified
goals.3 1 0 Corruption will persist until countries ensure that public
officials can earn a reasonable living through honest work.
Countries that pay their public officials well are, in effect, "buying
311
a layer of insulation against patronage and bribery."
Furthermore, it is imperative that public officials do not have
monopoly power over the distribution of goods or the performance
of services. Such monopoly control grants the official complete
discretion in setting prices and allocating goods and services.
Market reforms that encourage exposure of the public sector to
internal, domestic, and international competition will inhibit the
discretion of corrupt officials by dissolving state monopolies.3 12 As
bribes, artificial shortages, and transaction costs are reduced,

307.

CompareNichols, supranote 1, 361-64, 377-81 (arguing that the WTO

should be used to coordinate a global effort to combat transnational bribery
through the use of economic sanctions), with Muffler, supra note 7 (proposing a
mechanism of enforcement based on private causes of action rather than
criminalizing the action of bribery).

308.

309.
note 297,
310.
311.
312.

See Salbu, supranote 31, at 286.

For an example of such objectives and methods, see Klitgaard, supra
at 35-36.
Seeid.at36.
Leiken, Controllingthe Global CorruptionEpidemic, supranote 4, at 68.
See id.

1318

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1273

producers who previously relied on bribes to ensure profitability
quality and limiting
will instead be forced' to focus on improving
313
costs to compete in the marketplace.
The most efficient approach to curb transnational bribery will
involve cooperation among countries, international organizations,
multilateral
developments
banks,
and
nongovernmental
organizations dedicated to controlling corruption. While adopting
domestic laws
and international
treaties criminalizing
transnational bribery will contribute to restricting corrupt
transactions, a coordinated effort drawing upon a broad base of
support has a greater capacity to effect change on a larger scale.
Efforts by organizations such as the OECD and Transparency
International should be supported, and continuing advances
should be encouraged.

VI.

CONCLUSION

By undermining the efficiency of economic choices,
increasing the costs of transactions, reducing state revenues, and
contributing to popular distrust of the government, corruption
threatens political and economic stability and corrodes social
structures. Transnational bribery is a universal concern that
threatens the stability of economies around the globe. Although
corruption is "detrimental both socially and economically
whenever and wherever it occurs," it is particularly menacing to
developing countries whose growth depends on the ability to
compete in the new commercial world.3 14 Transnational bribery in
developing countries has led to declining standards of living,
hyper-inflation, and public skepticism regarding the viability of

democratic institutions. In countries like Russia, where pervasive
corruption has enabled organized crime to merge with the state,
popular support for democracy has waned and the resurgence of
socialism is considered by many to be a real threat.
As transnational bribery has become increasingly expensive both
economically and socially, anti-corruption reforms are gaining
support and growing in number. Movements against bribery and
corruption have emerged in countries around the world. Both public
and private organizations have lent their support to recent anti-

corruption efforts. International organizations, regional organizations,
and multilateral development banks have taken the first steps
towards criminalizing transnational bribery, but efforts so far have
proved to be only marginally effective. Robert Leiken has warned that

313.
314.

See i.
TI SOURCE BOOK, supranote 15, ch. 1.
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"[tioday's decisive battles for free trade, development, and democracy
3 15
may well be fought in the campaign against corrupt practices."
The need for a comprehensive strategy to control transnational
corruption has become apparent in this era of corruption exposes
and bribery scandals. The cooperation and coordination of both the
industrialized world and developing countries is imperative in
galvanizing adequate support for effective reforms.
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